Showing posts with label Sabermetrics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sabermetrics. Show all posts

Friday, April 25, 2008

What is Clutch?

Inspired by yet another article on the concept of clutch players in baseball, I thought I'd make a few comments about what clutch actually means.

To most sabermetric guys, a clutch player is one who improves his level of play in important situations.

To me, a clutch player is one who performs well in important situations.

There's a subtle difference there. For the sabermetric definition, a clutch player must perform worse in regular situations than in important situations, otherwise there would be no improvement in the clutch.

With my definition, a player who plays consistently well no matter what the situation can still be considered clutch. A player who plays consistently well cannot be considered clutch using the first definition.

My problem with the new sabermetric definition is that a lousy player can be less lousy but still bad and be considered clutch, as long as he performs his best in the appropriate situations. This has little value to any fan watching at home or any manager in an important game. You don't go to your worst player and put him in because he's not quite as bad as usual in these situations. Instead, you look to the guy who is going to perform the best.

If an all star like Alex Rodriguez hits for a few points less of AVG or OPS in clutch situations than he does normally, do you want him at the plate when it counts? Do you put in Wilson Betemit who hits better than his usual in pressure situations? If A-Rod's bad is still better than Betemit's good, you play A-Rod.

Unfortunately, the idea of a clutch hitter actually performing slightly worse in clutch situations than normal is entirely unsatisfying to many in the sabermetric community and so they chose to alter their definition to make their analyses look more interesting.

Countless hours have been spent trying to come up with statistical evidence to prove that clutch hitting doesn't exist. The sabermetric community can't stand the notions that certain players are "clutch" and the constant use of that term by fans and other baseball personnel. There has been a deluge of "David Ortiz is clutch" talk in the popular media that gets under the skin of many people. I agree that common perception in this matter is likely incorrect, that guys we often think of as "clutch" probably aren't the best performing players in pressure situations.

For me personally, if you asked me to recall guys I thought were clutch based on performances I watched, I would think back to a few memorable Jim Leyritz hits back in the late 90s and my all time favorite clutch moment - Aaron Boone's solo walk off home run in the bottom of the 11th inning in the 2005 ALCS game 7 between the Yankees and the Red Sox.

Our gut instincts and recollections of clutch players are greatly biased due to a small sample size and while fun to recall, have little practical value.

Unfortunately, many sabermetric fans have the notion that a clutch player is one who can perform better than he normally does in a clutch situation. This notion has little to no value either.

The bottom line is that a true clutch player is the one who will perform better than other players in important situations, regardless of how well or poor he plays normally, and this almost always comes down to the player who generally plays best all season long. It's not very exciting from a fan's point of view and it's not very interesting to extreme statisticians, but it's the only perspective that has some actual value in my opinion.

Thursday, April 24, 2008

Farnsworth Clutch?

David Appelman over at the Baseball Analysts seems to think so and has the math to prove it. Appelman took a look at various pitcher perfomances in high leverage index situations versus other situations. Leverage index is a way of measuring the importance of a particular situation based on inning, outs, score and runners. David then looked at pitchers' FIP or Fielding Independent Pitching, a statistic that just looks at things a pitcher controls (HR, BB, HBP, K) and eliminates those which involve his team's defense.

The gist of the article is that the author looked at FIP in high leverage situations compared to all other situations, and tallied up which pitchers did significantly better in high leverage or clutch situations. Appelman collected data over the last six seasons and found that Kyle Farnsworth was the 8th best clutch reliever.

It's a fun look at some wacky stats, and in the end is completely useless. Appelman himself noted that the data don't hold up from year to year, which tells me the basic principles of this measurement aren't valid. I don't care for FIP personally, and find it to be a wonky, selective statistic that overlooks what is really important here (things like base hits, doubles, sacrifice flies etc.).

David said he chose FIP because ERA didn't really work. This sounds very fishy. In what way did it not work? You didn't see the names you wanted popping up on the lists? This sounds like a case of the original methods not producing the results desired and so the author tried using different methods until he got the answers he wanted. In other words, selectively choosing data that will produce desired conclusion.

Addendum: David was kind enough to address my comments on the original website and also stopped by here to chime in. He basically explained that with his methodolgy, ERA wouldn't work because high leverage situations (particularly those with runners on base) generally produce more runs than low leverage situations (with no runners or fewer runners) and henceforth ERA would be elevated in those instances. This would skew results somewhat and produce bigger differences. The next question that comes to my mind then is are these differences significant (skewing the results for certain players) or would they be roughly the same for the players involved?

Eric Gagne is also one of the top relievers and I don't think anyone has accused him of being clutch last year.

By comparing high LI situations to all other situations, you don't factor in overall quality. The absolute worst pitcher in baseball could pitch significantly better in high LI situations, but still be worse than most other pitchers in those situations but would rank highly on David's chart.

Let me give a simple example of what I mean. Let's theoretically assign pitchers' abilities a score of 1-10, with 10 being the best.

-You're all star closer could perform at a level of 8 most of the time and a level of 10 in clutch situations, giving a difference of 2. With the methods used in the article, this value of 2 would be used to rank the pitcher.

-Joe average reliever pitches at a level of 5 most of the time and also delivers a 5 in clutch situations, giving a score of 0. This would rank below your all star (who has a 2).

-Now look at your horrendous reliever who normally pitches at a level of 1 but pitches at 4 in clutch situations, producing a difference of 3. Of all the pitchers, this guy would rank the highest with Appleman's methods, despite the fact that even at his best, he's still worse than anyone else.

Sabermetrics is an odd thing. There are a lot of fantastic insights into the game of baseball that have been uncovered by smart stat guys. Unfortunately, a lot of people just crank out stats, graphs and lists of numbers without thinking things through or putting much thought to the practicality of what they're saying.

This article is a fun read, as we can all look at the list, see guys like Farnsworth and Gagne on there, laugh, and say ha ha, I told you that guy was clutch, knowing full well there is little validity to the statement.

While I love sabermetrics, silly articles like this really give it a bad name if taken too seriously.

Addendum: David clarifies that the article was written from a perspective of "disproving clutch" and it has some utility in that respect. He and I differ greatly on our definition of "clutch", which is a big source of my frustration with some of this article's basic premises.

Sunday, April 13, 2008

Should Joe Have Pitched to Manny?

The Yankees lost to the Red Sox last night in a close game. The pivotal inning was the bottom of the 6th. With two outs and runners on 2nd and 3rd, Manny Ramirez is up to face Mike Mussina. Joe Girardi comes to the mound to have a discussion with his starter and decides to leave him in to face Manny and hopefully get the last out of the inning. Manny ends up hitting a double and scoring both runners.

The New York Post ran one of their typical pieces with the headline "Joe Blew It", announcing his breaking one of the ten commandments of baseball by pitching to Ramirez. A few other sources have been critical of Joe's decision in that situation and so I decided to take a little closer look.

One argument is that Joe should have brought in a reliever rather than let Mussina, who was starting to struggle, continue to pitch. That's a tough call. You like your starters to come in and pitch at least six innings, and Moose had gotten out of some jams before. Brian Bruney had been pitching well in relief all year and guys like Ohlendorf, Traber, Hawkins, Farnsworth were all available for early inning stints with Chamberlain and Rivera on tap for the late innings. When Bruney did come in he gave up another big hit for a run, which ended up credited to Mussina. The decision whether or not to pull Moose in favor of Bruney was a tough one, and at the time I was surprised to see Mussina stay in, giving the well rested bullpen that was available.

The real issue I'd like to take a look at is whether or not Mussina should have walked Manny to face the next batter instead. On deck was Kevin Youkilis, who has been hitting the ball well again this year and is no slouch at the plate. Mussina surmised that he had just as good of a chance to get Ramirez out as Youkilis and Girardi let him pitch.

To get to the bottom of this, let's look at some numbers. These stats are averages for AVG/OBP/SLG taken over the most recent complete seasons, 2005-2007.

Manny Ramirez .302/.404/.569

Kevin Youkilis .283/.386/.438

Manny definitely has an edge, especially in slugging. If we subtract each player's numbers we can see exactly how much worse Youkilis is:

Difference: -.019/-.018/-.131

James Click has a nice chapter in the book Baseball Between the Numbers and in it he details the math behind intentional walks. In situations when there are two on with two outs, Click concludes that the second batter has to be 60 points worse in average, 95 points worse in on-base percentage and 175 points worse in slugging. (I'm not going to go into detail on how Click reached these conclusions, check out the book or his work at Baseball Prospectus.) Despite Manny's impressive numbers, Youkilis is too good of a hitter to meet these criteria, and it looks like Girardi made the right call.

We can compare some splits, to see if the situation could have affected matters any. With runners in scoring position, each player's stats looked like this (again from 2005-2007):

Manny Ramirez .320/.443/.614

Kevin Youkilis .322/.420/.515

Difference: +.002/-.023/-.099

With runners in scoring position, the gap narrows in 2 out of 3 categories, with Youkilis even having a better AVG than Manny.

OK, how about specifically with runners on second and third, over the last 3 seasons.

Manny Ramirez .227/.486/.318

Kevin Youkilis .235/.367/.471

Kevin has the overall advantage here. This last set of numbers isn't as useful because it only includes 22 at bats for manny and 17 for Kevin. The more specific we get in regards to the situation, the less valuable are data becomes.

Lastly, let's take a look at the numbers vs. RHP

Manny Ramirez .304/.392/.563

Kevin Youkilis .284/.380/.450

Difference: -.020/-.012/-.113

Slightly less than the 3-year totals but not by much.

While Manny Ramirez is the superior hitter overall and with runners in scoring position and against right handed pitchers, the difference still isn't enough to justify an intentional walk with Youkilis backing him up. Joe Girardi made the right call in pitching to Manny.